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Abstract
To shed lights on growth, distribution and the relationships between the two,
we develop a growth model with heterogeneous individuals who care about social
status. Individuals’ heterogeneity stems from two sources: their innate skills and
their degree of ambition. While the willingness of individuals to accumulate wealth
depends whether they experience gain or pain from loss of status, we show that
ambition of individuals plays an important role regarding growth and distribution:
ambition can inhibit or foster accumulation of wealth, then in turn growth. In
such a context, we show that growth can be positively or negatively correlated with
inequalities.
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1 Introduction
The idea that the welfare of individuals depends not only on the quantity of goods con-
sumed, but also on their social status in society is by now well established and supported
by empirical evidence (Choudhary et al., 2007; Maurer and Meier, 2008). Also nicknamed
as “keeping up with the Joneses”, this concept has been used in growth models to an-
alyze the impact of social relations on growth performance (Corneo and Jeanne, 1997;
Rauscher, 1997; Futagami and Shibata, 1998; Fisher and Hof, 2000; Tournemaine and
Tsoukis, 2008), education (Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss, 1996), fertility (Tournemaine,
2008), and wealth distribution (Pham, 2005; Tsoukis, 2007). The formalization of individ-
uals’ positional concern usually consists of assuming that the social status of individuals
is determined by their level of wealth, consumption or education relative to a reference
standard which is taken to be, for simplicity, the arithmetic average in the economy.
One purpose of this paper is to relax this assumption. There is indeed no reason to
think that the reference standard to which individuals compare themselves is the average
itself or/and that this reference standard is the same for all individuals. As suggested by
Duesenberry (1949) and confirmed empirically by Bowles and Park (2005), social compar-
isons are mostly made in an upward manner: individuals with a high level of income are
likely to aﬀect the consumption’s decision of people with a low level of income because the
latter are looking to climb up the social status ladder. Similarly, Falk and Knell (2004)
suggest, and provide supporting empirical evidence, that the reference standard increases
with ability. In what follows, we thus assume that the reference standard that individuals
take into account in evaluating their position in society can be diﬀerent. Specifically, dif-
ferent groups may weigh diﬀerently their own and other groups’ performances. Taking the
reference standard of individuals as a proxy for their degree of ambition, we capture the
idea that individuals’ level of ambition is a factor aﬀecting their decisions regarding work
eﬀort, consumption and saving. Ceteris paribus, one aim of this paper is to investigate
how individuals’ level of ambition can alter growth and distribution.
To study the issue of optimal taxation, Abel (2005) has recently developed an over-
lapping generation model where each generation of individuals have diﬀerent preferences
for social status: formally, each generation of individuals has a particular reference stan-
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dard regarding consumption which is defined as a weighted geometric average of the per
capita consumption of the two living generations. However, in the exogenous growth
model of that paper, individuals turn out to be identical. In contrast, in this paper we
develop an infinite-horizon growth model where agents are heterogeneous, labour supply
is endogenous and growth is the outcome of endogenous accumulation of physical capital.
Heterogeneity among individuals stems not only from diﬀerent levels of ambition as said
above but also because they have diﬀerent innate skills. As the skills of individuals af-
fect the productivity in working activities, it allows us to generate income inequality and
investigate its relationship with long-run growth.
Moreover, following Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2007), in introducing the concept of
social aspirations and the way those aﬀect utility, we distinguish between the “average”
status eﬀect which is present in the standard literature on status seeking and growth and
what may be called “diﬀerential” status eﬀects. As will be seen, diﬀerential status eﬀects
are an important aspect of heterogeneity and allow us to make the distinction between
“gain from status” (when the utility of people increases faster than their relative position)
and “pain” from loss of status (when utility is lost faster than relative position). In
addition to the fact that these two distinctions have not been introduced in the literature
before, and are another innovation of this paper, we show that they play an important
role regarding the results we get.
To summarize, to the growing literature of status and its eﬀects on growth and dis-
tribution, we add three elements. Firstly, the idea that individuals may not look simply
at the average in judging their status, but may ”target” diﬀerent groups diﬀerently; sec-
ondly, the idea of heterogeneity in the status motive; thirdly, the ”gains” versus ”pains”
idea of how status aﬀects utility. While some of these themes have to some extent been
explored in previous literature, the particular contribution of this paper is to explore all
these inter-related aspects of the status motive as a whole; in doing so, this paper goes
beyond any of the existing papers on the macroeconomics of status. Our contribution can
indeed be seen as dual as it brings together the status theme strands with growth and
distribution that are themselves endogenously determined. We show in particular that
the decision of individuals to accumulate wealth depends on whether they experience gain
from status or pain from loss of status. In this context, the degree of ambition of individ-
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uals can either inhibit or foster their willingness to accumulate wealth. That is, the level
of ambition of individuals is a crucial determinant of growth, wealth distribution and the
relationship between the two.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the model.
In Section 3, we examine its key property regarding growth, distribution and the relation
between them. We conclude in Section 4.
2 Model
The main building block of the model is taken from Romer (1986). We consider a closed
economy in continuous time populated by a mass [0, 1] of infinitely-lived individuals. For
simplicity, we assume that there are two groups of identical individuals denoted by i,
i = 1, 2. Group 1 has a size β and group 2 has a size 1 − β. Each individual is initially
endowed with ki0 > 0 units of capital (wealth) at date zero and T units of labour-time.
She produces output, yit, which can be consumed, cit, or invested to give new units of
capital, kit. The technology for output is given by
yit = Ai(kit)α(ktlit)1−α, (1)
where 0 < α < 1, Ai > 0 is a time-invariant productivity parameter specific to individuals
of group i, lit is the amount of time devoted to the production of output and kt ≡ βk1t +
(1−β)k2t is the total stock of capital in the economy (learning by investing). Technology
(1) captures the idea that individuals benefit from a diﬀerent level of technology or have
diﬀerent innate skills, Ai, for the production of output. Without loss of generality we
assume that individuals of group 1 have a higher technology than those of group 2: A1 ≥
A2. In the particular case where A1 = A2, individuals of both groups have the same level
of technology.
Assuming that each unit of output devoted to investments yields one new unit of
capital, the resource constraint of an individual is given by
yit = cit +
•
kit. (2)
Individuals derive utility from their level of consumption, leisure and their social status.
The social status (“relative standing”) of individuals is determined by the ratio of their
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level of consumption, cit, to a specific reference standard denoted cit. As mentioned, one
key aspect of status heterogeneity is that the reference standard to which individuals
compare themselves is not necessarily given by the average level of consumption in the
economy . Furthermore, this reference standard can diﬀer across individuals (Falk and
Knell, 2004; Abel, 2005), so that heterogeneity stems from a diﬀerentiated status motive
as well as diﬀerent skills. Formally, the reference standard to which individuals of group
i compare themselves is given by:
cit = (c1t)
γi (c2t)
(1−γi) , (3)
where 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1 (resp. 0 ≤ 1− γi ≤ 1) is the weight that individuals of group i put on
the level of consumption of individuals of group 1 (resp. group 2) for the determination
of their reference standard. The reference standard (3) can be interpreted as a proxy for
the degree of ambition of an individual: under the assumption A1 ≥ A2, a low value of
γ1 denotes a low level of ambition as the reference standard of high-skilled individuals is
mainly determined by the level of consumption of low skills one (downward comparison).
Similarly, a high value of γ2 denotes a high level of ambition for individuals of group 2, as
they mostly compare themselves to high skilled individuals (upward comparison). If we
followed some of the arguments set out in the Introduction and the supporting empirical
evidence of Falk and Knell (2004), we would argue that more able individuals ought to
aim higher, thus γ1 > 1/2, and γ1 > (1− γ2), but we choose to address the general case
by not imposing such restrictions.
Preferences of the representative individual of group i are represented by the utility
function
Ui =
∞Z
0
[ln cit + lnΨ(cit/cit) + δ (T − lit)] e−ρtdt, (4)
where ρ > 0 is the rate of time preferences, δ > 0 is a measure of the marginal disutility
of work and Ψ (•) which is strictly increasing represents the preference of an individ-
ual regarding social status. As we will see, the crucial parameter out of the function
Ψ (•) to be used in the analysis is its elasticity with respect to social status: ψi ≡
(cit/cit)[∂Ψ (•) /∂(cit/cit)]. This elasticity measures how much individuals care about
social status: the greater this value is, the stronger are the status motives of individuals.
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A third key element of our status analysis relates to how status aﬀects utility: Following
Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2007), we shall find it convenient to introduce the following
approximation for the “status” elasticity:
ψi = η + φ ln
µ
cit
cit
¶
> 0, (5)
where η and φ are constant parameters. Parameter η represents the core of the “status”
elasticity. It can be interpreted as the “average” status eﬀect as it manifests itself whenever
individuals care about their status. We assume that η is strictly positive (η > 0) to ensure
that ψi is always positive. Parameter φ introduces the “diﬀerential” status eﬀect, and
is more fully and intuitively explained immediately below. The status elasticity (5) is
best understood as a tractable approximation to an elasticity that is not known with any
degree of certainty and that is likely to be rather complicated. Tsoukis (2007) shows that
most of the status functions used in the literature can be nested in single functional form
whose elasticity takes the form given by (5) and for which the values of parameters η and
φ can be computed. The status elasticity (5) eﬀectively re-writes the status functions as,
Ψ
µ
cit
cit
¶
=
µ
cit
cit
¶η+φ
2
ln(cit/cit)
. (6)
While Ψ (•) is upward-sloping, the parameter φ regulates its curvature which can be either
concave (φ < 0) or convex (φ > 0). A graphic illustration for Ψ (•) in the neighbourhood
of symmetry (i.e. A1 = A2 and γ1 = γ2) is shown in Figure 1 below:
Insert Figure 1 here
While passing from (1, 1), the φ > 0 curve gives increasingly more utility to individuals
above their reference standard, while the φ < 0 one penalises more emphatically those
below. In other words, the status elasticity (5) allows us to make the distinction between
“gain from status” and “pain from loss of status”. “Gain” from status arises if the sta-
tus function Ψ (•) increases faster than relative position, in the sense that its elasticity
increases with relative position. There is “pain” from loss of status if status is lost faster
than relative position.
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As mentioned, the fact that diﬀerent groups’ performances are weighted diﬀerently by
diﬀerent individuals in the construction of their reference standards, and the diﬀerential
eﬀects of status are joint aspects of heterogeneity, in addition to heterogeneity stemming
from skills. Interesting special cases include: The diﬀerential status eﬀect vanishes if
individuals are identical (i.e. A1 = A2 and γ1 = γ2) or if they compare themselves
exclusively to their peers (i.e. γ1 = 1 and γ2 = 0). In the former case, the reason is
that individuals are all alike implying c1t = c2t = ct in equilibrium. In the latter case,
the reason is that there is no cross-comparison between individuals belonging to diﬀerent
groups: the steady-state equilibrium is such that c1t = c1t and c2t = c2t with c1t 6= c2t
as long as A1 6= A2. In the absence of any empirical evidence, the “diﬀerential” status
eﬀect can be either positive or negative. We only assume that it is bounded from above:
(1− γ1)φ+ γ2φ < 1. This will ensure the existence of a solution at steady-state. We will
come back shortly on the interpretation of the term (1− γ1)φ+ γ2φ in Section 3 where it
is more appropriate.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Individuals’ problem
Each individual chooses consumption, labor and wealth to maximize (4) subject to (1)-
(3). In solving this problem, we assume, as is standard (e.g. Falk and Knell, 2004),
that individuals take cit as given. That is, we consider that individuals are so small
that the change of consumption of one individual has no eﬀect on the reference standard
of individual i. In particular, individual i treats cit independently of her own decision.
Formally, we have ∂cit/∂cjt = 0, for i, j = 1, 2. After manipulation, the current-value
Hamiltonian of this problem for an individual of group i is
CVH = ln cit + lnΨ(cit/cit) + δ (T − lit) + λit[Ai (kit)α (ktlit)1−α − cit],
where λit is the co-state variable associated with (2). The first order conditions are
∂CV H/∂cit = 0, ∂CV H/∂lit = 0 and ∂CV H/∂kit = −
•
λit + λitρ. The transversality
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condition is lim
t→∞
λitkite−ρt = 0. Rearranging the first order conditions, we get:
1
cit
(1 + ψi) = λit, (7)
(1− α) (1 + ψi) yit
litcit
= δ, (8)
αyit
kit
+
•
λit
λit
= ρ. (9)
Expression (7) states that the marginal utility of consumption equals the marginal benefit
of wealth. Equation (8) states that the marginal benefit of an additional unit of time
spent to working activities equals its marginal cost measured by utility losses. Expression
(9) is an asset-pricing equation stating that the rate of return of wealth, given by the
productivity of capital plus the change in the shadow price, is equal to the discount rate.
3.2 Characterization of the steady-state
For simplicity, in the rest of the paper we restrict our attention to the steady-state equi-
librium. It is worthwhile to mention that in this case the growth rate of variables must be
common across agents of diﬀerent groups. The reason is that otherwise someone would
end up owning the whole of the economy asymptotically.1 As a result, all the key ratios,
like relative consumption between groups, consumption-to-capital, and output-to-capital,
are all constant. Time subscripts are dropped when quantities are constant, but kept for
individual, perpetually growing, variables. We denote by g the common growth rate of
capital, consumption and output.
From equation (9) we have
yit
kit
=
g + ρ
α
. (10)
Combining (2) and (10) yields
cit
kit
=
(1− α)g + ρ
α
. (11)
Equations (10) and (11) imply that
yit
cit
=
g + ρ
(1− α)g + ρ. (12)
1See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch. 3) for more details on this point.
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Plugging (12) in (8) yields
li =
(1− α) (g + ρ) (1 + ψi)
δ [(1− α)g + ρ] . (13)
As relative consumption, and therefore the status elasticity ψi are constant in the steady
state, so is labour. A noteworthy feature here is that heterogeneity aﬀects labour supply
only via its eﬀect on status. Such result has implication for the relative capital in each
group. Combining (1) and (10), the relative capital in each group is given by:
Ai
µ
kit
kt
¶α−1
(li)
1−α =
g + ρ
α
. (14)
More formally, plugging (13) in (14), we get:
Ai
µ
kit
kt
¶α−1 ∙
(1− α) (g + ρ)
δ [(1− α)g + ρ]
¸1−α
[1 + ψi]
1−α =
g + ρ
α
. (15)
Accordingly, relative capital is influenced by two factors: individuals’ skills and labour
supply. The total eﬀect of skills arises both directly, and via, and mediated by, the various
aspects of the status motive. In what follows, we seek to determine how heterogeneity
(skills and heterogeneous skills motives) aﬀects the relative values of these variables be-
tween groups to study the eﬀects on growth and distribution. As shown in Appendix,
manipulation of (10)-(15) yields the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 Under the assumption φ < 1/(1−γ1+γ2), the steady-state equilibrium is
characterised by a unique economic rate of growth, g, and unique shares of capital owned
by individuals of group 1 and 2 (k1t/kt, k2t/kt) which verify:
k1t
kt
= Ω(g) (A1)
1
(1−α)
µ
A1
A2
¶ (1−γ1)φ(1−α)[1−(1−γ1)φ−γ2φ]
, (16)
k2t
kt
= Ω(g) (A2)
1
(1−α)
µ
A1
A2
¶ −γ2φ(1−α)[1−(1−γ1)φ−γ2φ]
, (17)
1 = β
k1t
kt
+ (1− β)k2t
kt
, (18)
where Ω(•) is a strictly decreasing and strictly convex function given by
Ω(g) =
∙
(1− α) (g + ρ)
δ [(1− α)g + ρ]
¸µ
g + ρ
α
¶−1/(1−α)
[exp η] . (19)
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The amount of labour devoted to the production of output is given by:
li =
(1− α) (g + ρ)
δ [(1− α)g + ρ]
∙
1 + η + φ ln
µ
cit
cit
¶¸
, i = 1, 2. (20)
Examination of equations (16) and (17) shows that for a given level of growth the
share of capital owned by individuals of group i, kit/kt, i = 1, 2, depends on two ele-
ments. The first one is the level of technology of individuals of group i, Ai, which aﬀects
positively the share of capital owned by individuals of that group. The second element
(i.e. (A1/A2)
(1−γ1)φ/{(1−α)[1−(1−γ1)φ−γ2φ]} in (16) and (A1/A2)
−γ2φ/{(1−α)[1−(1−γ1)φ−γ2φ]} in (17)
captures the eﬀect from status comparison.
While the eﬀect of the first element is straightforward (an increase in the levels of
skills of individuals allows them to increase the quantity of wealth they accumulate),
the eﬀect of second one is more complex. Observe that the shares of capital owned
by individuals of group i, kit/kt, can be either positively or negatively correlated with
the skills-ratio, A1/A2. The outcome depends whether the diﬀerential status eﬀect, φ, is
positive or negative, thereby it depends whether individuals experience gains from status
(φ > 0) or pains from loss of status (φ < 0).
Note also that the size of the diﬀerential status eﬀect depends itself on the degree of
ambitions of individuals as captured by the parameters γ1 and γ2. The term (1 − γ1)φ
can indeed be interpreted as the diﬀerential status eﬀect on utility, arising from the
comparison of group 1 with group 2, and similarly γ2φ is a measure of the diﬀerential
status eﬀect due to the comparison of group 2 with group 1. As such, the sum of these
two terms, (1− γ1)φ+ γ2φ, assumes a natural interpretation: It is the sum of the eﬀects
on utility of cross-boundary comparisons, and are thus an indicator of the overall eﬀect
of heterogeneous status motives on utility. For instance, a higher ambition by individuals
in group 1 (captured by an increase of γ1) or a lower ambition by individuals in group 2
(captured by a decrease of γ2) leads to a reduction of the overall eﬀect. It will be useful to
keep this interpretation in mind in the next two sub-sections where we analyse the eﬀects
of heterogeneity on distribution and growth.
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3.3 Distribution
To analyse distribution (i.e. inequalities), it is convenient to combine equations (16) and
(17) in Proposition 1. Moreover, using (10), (11), (12)), we get:
c1t
c2t
=
k1t
k2t
=
y1t
y2t
=
µ
A1
A2
¶ 1
(1−α)[1−(1−γ1)φ−γ2φ]
. (21)
Examination of (21) leads to Propositions 2 and 3 below:
Proposition 2 For any value of the weights γ1 and γ2, individuals of both groups end up
with the same amount of consumption, wealth and income if they have the same technology
(skills): A1 = A2.
The reason is that for A1 = A2 individuals share the same technology so that they have
the same ability to produce, to consume and to save. As the source of income heterogeneity
has vanished, the reference standard to which individuals compare themselves turns out to
be the same although the values of γ1 and γ2 diﬀer: we have c1t = c2t = ct = c1t = c2t = ct.
The solution we obtain is thus the same as the one with purely symmetric agents (i.e.
A1 = A2 and γ1 = γ2). We can verify that the basic results depicted in the literature
follow. In particular, higher status motive in consumption, captured by an increase in η,
has positive eﬀects on labour supply, wealth accumulation and growth (see Proposition
1).
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the case A1 > A2. From equation (21), we can
state:
Proposition 3 Under the assumption A1 > A2 and φ < 1/(1− γ1 + γ2) :
a) inequalities are positively correlated with the level of technology of individuals of group
1, A1, the diﬀerential status eﬀect, φ, and the degree of ambition of individuals of group
1, γ1;
b) inequalities are negatively correlated with the level of technology of individuals of group
2, A2, and the degree of ambition of individuals of group 2, γ2.
Proposition 3 establishes the properties of the model regarding distribution. The
positive (resp. negative) relationship between inequalities and the level of technologies
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A1 (resp. A2), comes from the fact that individuals of group 1 benefit initially from a
better level of technology (A1 > A2). As a result, an increase in their level of technology
will further increase inequalities while an increase in A2 will reduce the gap.
The interesting result here concerns the diﬀerential status eﬀect and the degree of am-
bitions of individuals. As mentioned in Section 2 and as can be verified from Proposition
1, the diﬀerential status eﬀect, φ, is an indicator of heterogeneity which vanishes under
symmetry. When individuals experience pains from loss of status (φ < 0), we can verify
that individuals’ status elasticities are such that ψ1 < ψ2 : low skilled individuals care
more about their status than high skilled ones. This is because a reduction in the social
status aﬀects low skilled individuals’ well-being in a larger extent than the high skilled
ones. In this case, the pain (fear) from loss of status induces them to work harder so
that: l1 < l2 (see equation (20)). Thereby, the additional amount of time that low skilled
individuals spend in the production of output relative to the high skilled ones allows them
to reduce the gap of inequalities initially due to the level of technologies (A1 > A2). As
the diﬀerential status eﬀect, φ, increases, however, the motivation of the low skilled indi-
viduals, captured by ψ2, decreases while the motivation of the high skilled ones, captured
by ψ1, increases. As such, there is a negative correlation between diﬀerential status eﬀect
and inequalities. Observe that if individuals experience gains from status (φ > 0), the
preceding results are reversed: we have ψ1 > ψ2. In this case, high skilled individuals
care more about their status than the low skilled ones inducing them to work harder (see
equation (20)): l1 > l2.
As shown above, the role of the diﬀerential status eﬀect is crucial regarding distri-
bution. As implicitly stated in Proposition 2, the reason is that the main source of
heterogeneity is the diﬀerence in the level of technology. Ambition, however, can lower
or foster these eﬀects. Basically, if individuals compare mostly themselves to their peers
(i.e. when γ1 is large and γ2 is small), the diﬀerential eﬀect, φ, is reduced. If, however,
individuals start comparing themselves more outside their group (i.e. ambition of indi-
viduals of group 1 decreases whereas ambition of individuals of group 2 increases), the
diﬀerential status eﬀect is fostered.
To summarise our basic findings regarding distribution, we can state:
Corollary:
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a) More “pains from lack of status”, φ < 0, induce low skilled individuals to work harder
while more “gains from status” , φ > 0, have positive eﬀects on the amount of time that
high skilled individuals allocate to working activities. Thus, while more pains from status
reduce inequalities, more gains from status increase inequalities.
b) The degree of ambition of individuals matters as it can foster or dampen the diﬀerential
status eﬀect.
3.4 Growth and growth-inequality relationship
In this sub-Section, we spell out the implications for growth and discuss the relationship
between growth and distribution. From (16), (17) and (18), simple computations lead to
an equation for growth as follows:
1 = Ω(g)( eA)1/(1−α)cσ2A, (22)
where eA is a (geometric) weighted average of skill levels, defined as:
eA ≡ (A1)β(A2)1−β, (23)
and cσ2A , which can be interpreted as a composite measure of inequality of skills, inclusive
of the various eﬀects of status heterogeneity, is given by:
cσ2A ≡ βµA1A2
¶ (1−β)(1−γ2φ)+β(1−γ1)φ(1−α)[1−(1−γ1)φ−γ2φ]
+ (1− β)
µ
A1
A2
¶−β[1−(1−γ1)φ]+(1−β)γ2φ
(1−α)[1−(1−γ1)φ−γ2φ]
. (24)
The term cσ2A yields indeed an intuitive measure of the eﬀects of heterogeneity between
the two groups on economic growth. Intuitively, under the assumption A1 > A2, a higher
value of A1 means higher heterogeneity in skills while a higher value of A2 means a
reduction of heterogeneity. In equation (24), the skills ratio is corrected by the relative
size of the groups, the diﬀerential status and the degree of ambition of individuals.
The reduced form of the growth rate given in equation (22) is then very useful as it
allows us to decompose the eﬀects of changes in skills heterogeneity into two fundamental
components: the average skills eﬀect measured by eA and the diﬀerential skills eﬀect
measured by cσ2A. Furthermore, this is interesting for two reasons: firstly because as shown
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above there is an important distinction to be made between innate skills inequality and
distribution. In this respect, the crucial question is whether the original skills inequality is
amplified or attenuated by the mechanisms studied here when we study economic growth.
Secondly, it is interesting because the literature has not found a consensus regarding the
relationship between growth and inequality. For instance, Persson and Tabellini (1994)
present cross-country evidence of a negative eﬀect of inequality on growth. In contrast,
using a panel of U.S. states Partridge (1997) conclude that greater inequality is associated
with greater growth. Other studies, finally, conclude that changes in income and changes
in inequality are unrelated (Deninger and Squire, 1996; Chen and Ravallion, 1997).
Examination of (22) shows that growth rises unambiguously with average skills, eA.
The eﬀects of heterogeneity in skills, however, is ambiguous. The second component on
the right hand side of (24) receives a negative exponent. Thus, more heterogeneity in
skills in general has an ambiguous eﬀect on economic growth. The reason is that skills
heterogeneity may be amplified or attenuated when translated into economic growth,
through labour supply and the mechanisms of status seeking. This is significant, as much
recent literature tends to view the recent increases in inequality as the result of skills-
biased technical progress - eﬀectively, the widening gap between the demands for the
high and low skills. This would be analogous to a rise in exogenous skills heterogeneity
in this framework. As special cases, we can note that greater heterogeneity in skills
leads to higher growth when the group of the highly skilled is suﬃciently more sizable
(β much higher than 1 − β) and ”gains” from status prevail (φ > 0). In this case, the
more able individuals are motivated to work harder and their contribution to economic
growth overcomes the negative eﬀect induced by the reduction of time that low skilled
individuals allocate to output production: skills inequality is positively related to growth.
However, if the ”pains” prevailed and the more able individuals were also more numerous,
then growth might not increase as the able individuals may not be suﬃciently motivated:
in this case, skills inequality is negatively related to growth. Finally, if the less able are
suﬃciently more numerate and ”pains” prevails, inequality also is positively correlated
with growth, as inequality motivates the less able to try harder.
The degree of ambition (as captured by γ1 and γ2) is also an important influence
as evidenced above. Thus, there are interesting interplays between size of groups, the
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curvature of the status function in utility (diﬀerential eﬀects: ”gains” versus ”pains”) and
ambition in shaping the relationship between growth and inequality. Highlighting those
in a clear-cut manner epitomises the contribution of our paper.
We formalise the above in Propositions 4 and 5 below:
Proposition 4 Growth rises unambiguously with average skills but can be positively or
negatively correlated with skills heterogeneity.
Proposition 5 Skills heterogeneity may be amplified or attenuated through labour supply
as aﬀected by the various aspects of the status-seeking motive.
4 Conclusion
We have developed a simple growth model with heterogeneous individuals who care about
their social status. Heterogeneity between individuals stems from two sources: their
innate skills and their diversified ways by which they make comparisons to determine
their status. Our core contribution is to analyze the various aspects of the status motive -
heterogeneous reference standards, ambition, and the diﬀerential eﬀect of status on utility
(”gain” versus ”pain”). In a standard AK growth model, we have highlighted the eﬀects
of these two sources of heterogeneity on growth, inequality, and the relationship between
the two. In doing so, we have pointed out the ways by which these interrelated aspects of
the status motive impinge on macroeconomic outcomes. We have also shown that status,
and its various aspects, is crucial in understanding the ambiguous relationship between
growth and (consumption) inequality pointed out in the literature.
5 Appendix: equations (16) and (17)
Using (11) and cit = (c1t)
γi (c2t)
(1−γi) , we get
cit
cit
=
[(1− α)g + ρ] kit/α
(k1t)
γi (k2t)
(1−γi) [(1− α)g + ρ] /α
=
kit
kit
, (25)
where kit = (k1t)
γi (k2t)
(1−γi) . Next, to compute (16) and (17), it is convenient to approx-
imate ln(1 +ψi) ≈ ψi. This can be done in the neighbourhood of symmetry. In this case,
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from (15), (25) and the linearization of the status function (5), we get:
(Ai)
µ
kit
kt
¶α−1 ∙
(1− α) (g + ρ)
δ [(1− α)g + ρ]
¸1−α
(exp η)1−α
µ
kit
kit
¶φ(1−α)
=
µ
g + ρ
α
¶
.
Using kit = (k1t)
γi (k2t)
(1−γi) yieldsµ
k1t
kt
¶[1−(1−γ1)φ]
= Ω(g) (A1)
1/(1−α)
µ
k2t
kt
¶−(1−γ1)φ
, (26)
and µ
k2t
kt
¶[1−γ2φ]
= Ω(g) (A2)
1/(1−α)
µ
k1t
kt
¶−γ2φ
, (27)
where Ω(g) is defined in equation (19). Combining (26) and (27) leads to (16) and (17)
in the text. Combining (16), (17), (19) and kt ≡ βk1t + (1− β)k2t allows us to determine
the steady-state values of k1t/kt, k2t/kt and g. Computations show that a solution exists
if (1− γ1)φ+ γ2φ < 1.
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